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ABSTRACT
The Fourth Amendment provides limited protections for automobile
passengers against governmental intrusion. A passenger is only protected
against unreasonable searches in places where he harbors a reasonable
expectation of privacy. The Supreme Court has not yet considered the
reasonable expectation of privacy of passengers in Uber and Lyft. The
modern transportation innovations require that the Court consider the
reasonableness of the existing Fourth Amendment doctrine. In application,
the doctrine does not adequately protect Uber and Lyft passengers, because
it fails to consider how transportation advances have evolved society’s
privacy expectations. To remedy these shortcomings, the Court must
establish consistent jurisprudence for privacy rights in vehicles.
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INTRODUCTION
Last Saturday evening, as a night of dancing and champagne in New
York City was coming to an end, I considered my options for getting back to
my hotel. I thought to myself, “Hmmm, I could be a true ‘New Yorker’ and
walk in the blistering cold or I could hail a taxicab.” As I stepped outside the
bar and a chilling gust of wind struck me and my younger sister, she turned
to me and said: “If you want to get home before sunrise, let’s call an Uber!”
I shuffled to open the Uber application on my phone and requested a ride.
Immediately, I was matched with Roberto, a driver with a near perfect rating
of 4.8 stars. As we waited for the car to arrive, the Uber application invited
me to explore the driver’s profile. I learned that Roberto had been driving for
Uber for eleven months, and that he spoke both English and Spanish.
Thankfully, the Uber arrived in few minutes. Once we were inside, I
turned to my younger sister and asked: “Why did you insist that I call an
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Uber? We could’ve hailed a taxi if we had a little more patience.” My
millennial sister flashed a sarcastic grin and said, “C’mon, everyone uses
ridesharing apps like Uber and Lyft nowadays because it’s cheaper, faster,
and more convenient. We could’ve called the Uber from inside the bar and it
would’ve been waiting for us before we even stepped outside.” She
continued, “Plus, I feel more comfortable because I can check out the driver’s
credentials before the car gets here. I guess I just feel safer and ‘in control’
when I take an Uber.”
In that moment, I realized the immense impact ridesharing services like
Uber and Lyft had made in the transportation industry. I understood why
Uber and Lyft were so popular: the car—which I refer to as a “modern forhire vehicle”1—arrived quickly, the service was offered at a competitive fare,
and the process for requesting the ride was seamless. Most importantly,
riding in a non-commercial car made me feel like I was riding with a friend:
I could sit wherever I wanted, and I could adjust the radio at my leisure.
Despite the fact that I had never met my driver, browsing through his profile
made me feel safer than I would a feel in a taxicab. What I did not know at
the moment was that the feeling of greater safety may have just been a
double-edged sword.
As a passenger in an automobile, an individual may be subject to police
interference. As a general matter, the Fourth Amendment protects individuals
against unreasonable searches and seizures.2 Normally, a police officer must
have a lawful warrant to conduct a search, otherwise the search is “per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”3 But under the automobile
exception, officers are authorized to conduct warrantless searches of
automobiles.4 Further, the common enterprise assumption5 and the search
incident to arrest rule6 sometimes allow officers to conduct warrantless
searches of the passenger compartment of the vehicle, including any person,
“purse, briefcase, or other container within that space.”7
Nevertheless, “a search which is reasonable at its inception may violate
the Fourth Amendment”8 if an officer conducts a warrantless search of a

1 This Comment will use the term “traditional for-hire vehicle” to describe taxicabs, limousines,
and buses. On the other hand, it will use the term “modern for-hire vehicle” to describe the quasi-private
vehicles used by ridesharing companies such as Uber and Lyft.
2

U.S. CONST. amend IV.

3

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).

4

See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).

5

See generally Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999).

6

See generally Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).

7

Id. at 345.

8

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18 (1968).
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passenger’s person or belongings without a lawful basis.9 To claim the
protection of the Amendment, a non-owner passenger must have “a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded” vehicle.10 In essence, the
passenger “must demonstrate that he personally has an expectation of privacy
in the place searched, and that his expectation is reasonable.”11 Therefore,
under the Fourth Amendment, anything that an individual “seeks to preserve
as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected.”12 And an individual’s expectation of privacy is reasonable if he
“owns or lawfully possesses or controls property . . . by virtue of this right to
exclude.”13
In this day and age, technology is granting the government greater
access to areas and information that individuals “seek[] to preserve as
private.”14 This raises serious issues in regard to individuals’ Fourth
Amendment protections, because greater governmental access could infringe
on an individual’s right to exclude. Currently, the Supreme Court has
considered the effect of technology on an individual’s Fourth Amendment
rights in only a select number of cases.15 For example, in Jones v. United
States, the Supreme Court made clear that individuals are not protected from
all forms of governmental interference under the Fourth Amendment.16 The
Court reinforced the premise that the Amendment “protects against
trespassory searches only with regard to those items (‘persons, houses,
papers, and effects’) that it enumerates.”17 Further, it noted that “the Fourth
Amendment is [not] concerned with ‘any technical trespass that led to the
gathering of evidence.’”18 In fact, “trespass on ‘houses’ or ‘effects,’ or a Katz
invasion of privacy, is not alone a search [protectable under the Amendment]
unless it is done to obtain information; and the obtaining of information is
not alone a search unless it is achieved by such a trespass or invasion of

9 See generally Gant, 556 U.S. at 332 (extending the scope of a search incident to arrest to include
the passenger compartment if it is within the arrestee’s reach at the time of arrest or if it is reasonable to
believe that evidence of the offense of arrest could be found in the vehicle); Houghton, 526 U.S. at 295
(allowing warrantless searches of passengers who are believed to be engaged in a common enterprise with
the driver).
10

Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353

(1967)).
11

Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998).

12

Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.

13

Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12.

14

Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.

15

See generally United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 411 n.8 (2012).

16

Id.

17

Id.

18

Id. (citation omitted).
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privacy.”19 In sum, the Court held that “the [g]overnment’s installation of a
GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the
vehicle’s movements”20 was a physical intrusion that “would have been
considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it
was adopted.”21
By reviving the common-law trespassory test in Jones,22 the Court
suggested that individuals’ privacy rights are shrinking in the technological
age. Considering that physical intrusion is no longer necessary for many
forms of surveillance, the government can easily access an individual’s
private areas and information without violating the Fourth Amendment.23 In
the concurring opinion, Justice Sotomayor notes that the “technological
advances that have made possible nontrespassory surveillance techniques
will also affect the Katz test by shaping the evolution of societal privacy
expectations.”24 It seems that Justice Sotomayor’s insightful understanding
of the intersection between technology and the Fourth Amendment will play
a vital role for the protection of privacy rights in the midst of a technology
driven world. But for now, as technology advances and continues to provide
the government greater access to private areas and information, an
individual’s zone of privacy will continue to shrink.
Although the trend of shrinking privacy interests does not come as a
surprise when it comes to technology, it would be unexpected in modern
transportation. Despite the understanding that an individual has a diminished
privacy interest in vehicles, that interest “is nevertheless important and
deserving of constitutional protection.”25 With the advent of Uber and Lyft,
the scope of a passenger’s protection from police interference in a modern
for-hire vehicle is unclear. Simply put, under the current Fourth Amendment
doctrine, it is unsettled whether a passenger in a modern for-hire vehicle has
“a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.”26
Modern for-hire vehicles raise serious questions about the
reasonableness of the existing Fourth Amendment doctrine.27 Currently,
19

Id. at 408 n.5 (referencing Katz, 389 U.S. 347).

20

Jones, 565 U.S. at 404.

21

Id. at 404–05.

22

Id. at 409.

23

See id. at 414–15 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).

24

Id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (referencing Katz, 389 U.S. at 347). “I would take these
attributes of GPS monitoring into account when considering the existence of a reasonable societal
expectation of privacy in the sum of one’s public movements.” Id.
25

Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 345 (2009).

26

Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).

27

See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299–300 (1999) (explaining that to determine
whether a warrantless search of a passenger in a vehicle violates the Fourth Amendment, the court “must
evaluate the search or seizure under traditional standards of reasonableness by assessing, on the one hand,
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passengers are left to balance their interest in easier, cheaper rides against the
disadvantage of unclear Constitutional rights. Is this a risk every rider is
willing to take in order to save a couple of dollars? Probably not, and the
most daunting concern is that the majority of modern for-hire passengers are
not aware of these risks. Yet, one thing is certain: “technological
advances . . . will . . . affect the Katz test by shaping the evolution of societal
privacy expectations.”28 But because the existing jurisprudence is outdated,
it fails to account for the modern innovations of transportation and how it has
transformed society’s privacy expectations.
In anticipation of cases concerning searches of passengers in modern
for-hire vehicles, the Supreme Court needs to establish consistent
jurisprudence for privacy rights in vehicles. Future courts should find that
passengers in modern for-hire vehicles have a reasonable expectation of
privacy, because these passengers’ subjective expectation of privacy is “one
that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”29 This Comment will
analyze the existing Fourth Amendment doctrine and use it as a tool for
discussing the reasonableness of warrantless searches of passengers in
modern for-hire vehicles. The introduction introduces the Fourth
Amendment concerns of passengers in modern for-hire vehicles. Part I
discusses the existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Part II of this
Comment provides a taxonomy for passenger rides under the Fourth
Amendment and provides background on each classification. Part III
addresses the forward-looking application of the current Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence to determine the reasonableness of searches of passengers in
modern for-hire vehicles. Part IV proposes the creation of a set of cogent
guidelines to be used by future courts who will address the Fourth
Amendment protections of passengers in modern for-hire vehicles.
I.

REMEMBERING THE ANTIQUE FOURTH AMENDMENT
DOCTRINE

A.

The Fourth Amendment and Privacy Interests

The Fourth Amendment provides the “right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures.”30 “The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is

the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is
needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests”).
28

Jones, 565 U.S. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (referencing Katz, 389 U.S. at 347).

29

Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).

30

Houghton, 526 U.S. at 299 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
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reasonableness.”31 Only governmental actions are subject to the Fourth
Amendment, specifically, actions that constitute a “search or seizure”32 as
defined by the courts.33 To determine whether a search violates the Fourth
Amendment, the court “must evaluate the search . . . under traditional
standards of reasonableness”34 by focusing on “the governmental interest
which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected
interests of the private citizen.”35 Then it must balance the “the need to search
. . . against the invasion which the search . . . entails.”36
An individual’s right to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment
depends “upon whether the . . . [individual] has a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the invaded place.”37 In Katz v. United States, Justice Harlan’s
concurrence pronounces a two-prong test for this determination.38 First, an
individual must exhibit “an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy” in the
invaded place.39 Second, an individual’s subjective expectation of privacy
must be legitimate, meaning it must be one that society is prepared to
recognize as objectively reasonable.40
To meet the second prong of the Katz test, an individual’s expectation
of privacy must stem from “a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either
by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings
that are recognized and permitted by society.”41 Despite the Court’s
recognition that a search can occur without physical intrusion,42 “[r]ecent
cases . . . reflect the Supreme Court’s continued consideration of property
interests in determining Fourth Amendment privacy interests.”43 As
traditionally held in Rakas v. Illinois:

31

Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991).

32

Reasonable seizures under the Fourth Amendment are beyond the scope of this Comment.

33

See Houghton, 526 U.S. at 299; see generally Dante P. Trevisani, Passenger Standing to
Challenge Searches and Seizures: A Distinction Without a Constitutional Difference, 61 FLA. L. REV.
329, 332–33 (2009).
34

Houghton, 526 U.S. at 299–300.

35

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).

36

Id. (citation omitted).

37

Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353

(1967).
38

Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).

39

Id.; see Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143.

40

See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143; Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).

41

Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12.

42

See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.

43

United States v. Acosta, 965 F.2d 1248, 1256–57 (3d Cir. 1992). See generally Florida v. Riley,
488 U.S. 445 (1989); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988); United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294
(1987).
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While “[e]xpectations of privacy protected by the Fourth
Amendment . . . need not be based on a common-law interest
in real or personal property, . . . by focusing on legitimate
expectations of privacy in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, the Court has not altogether abandoned use of
property concepts in determining the presence or absence of
the privacy interests protected by that Amendment.”44
All in all, an individual who owns, lawfully possesses, or controls property
is likely to have a legitimate expectation of privacy in that property because
he has a right to exclude others.45
Accordingly, under the Fourth Amendment, an individual does not have
the same degree of protection in all invaded places.46 If an individual has a
lesser expectation of privacy, the individual will be subject to greater police
intrusion. In other words, a lawful search under the Fourth Amendment will
have fewer restrictions if the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy
is diminished. The Supreme Court has established extensive precedent which
essentially categorizes invaded places into a hierarchy of greater or lesser
privacy protections.
At the top of the hierarchy and “[a]t the Amendment’s ‘very core’ stands
‘the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion.’”47 An individual’s privacy interests in
his own home are almost absolute, but an individual’s privacy interests in the
home of another may be diminished.48 In Minnesota v. Carter, the Court
equated an overnight guest’s privacy interests with those of the home
owner.49 On the other hand, the Carter Court held that commercial guests did
not have the heightened protections enjoyed by a home owner because “[a]n
expectation of privacy in commercial premises, however, is different from,

44 United States v. Kennedy, 638 F.3d 159, 164 (3d Cir. 2011) (alteration in original) (quoting
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12).
45 See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12 (“One of the main rights attaching to property is the right to
exclude others, . . . and one who owns or lawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood
have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of this right to exclude.”); see also Kennedy, 638 F.3d
at 164 (citing Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12) (“[O]ne who owns or lawfully possesses or controls property
will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of [his] right to exclude.”).
46 See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013) (explaining that private property must be
enumerated in the Amendment’s text to be protected and introduces the concept of heightened or lessened
protections).
47

Id. (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).

48

See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (explaining that the Supreme Court has “held
that in some circumstances a person may have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the house of someone
else”).
49 Id. at 90 (“[A]n overnight guest in a home may claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment,
but one who is merely present with the consent of the householder may not.”).
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and indeed less than, a similar expectation in an individual’s home.”50 Further
down on the hierarchy of privacy interests are vehicles. The Court “has
traditionally drawn a distinction between automobiles and homes or offices
in relation to the Fourth Amendment.”51 In other words, individuals have a
diminished expectation of privacy “in a motor vehicle because its function is
transportation and it seldom serves as one’s residence or as the repository of
personal effects . . . [i]t travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants
and its contents are in plain view.”52 While, “people are not shorn of all
Fourth Amendment protection when they step from their homes onto the
public sidewalks,” a higher degree of police intrusion is acceptable.53
Nonetheless, the diminished privacy interest of vehicle occupants is
constitutionally protected.54 And so, while it is well established that the
Amendment protects people, not places, an individual’s protection may
depend on where that individual is.55
B.

An Individual’s Diminished Expectation of Privacy in
Automobiles

In consideration of the principles detailed above, the courts have
established various rules which provide guidance for future courts to
delineate the privacy interests of an individual in an automobile. To begin, a
search of a person, house, paper, or effect under the Fourth Amendment
requires a warrant based upon probable cause.56 Warrantless searches “are
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment – subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”57 It is undisputed
that automobiles are enumerated as “effects” in the Fourth Amendment,58 but
“warrantless examinations of automobiles have been upheld in circumstances
in which a search of a home or office would not.”59 This section will discuss
two exceptions to the warrant requirement that allow warrantless searches of
automobiles: the automobile exception and the search incident to arrest
50

Id. (quoting New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700 (1987)).

51

South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976).

52

Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974).

53

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979). See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

54

See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 345 (2009).

55

See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998) (“But the extent to which the Fourth
Amendment protects people may depend upon where those people are.”); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 351 (1967).
56

See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.

57

Id.

58

United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012) (“[A] vehicle is an ‘effect’ as that term is used
in the Amendment.”).
59

South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976).
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exception. Additionally, it will discuss the common enterprise assumption,
which also allows warrantless searches of passengers.
1.

The Automobile Exception

In United States v. Carroll, the Court provided a warrant requirement
specific to automobiles.60 Under the automobile exception, a warrantless
search of an automobile is permissible if based upon probable cause, “that is,
upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing
officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is
subject to seizure and destruction.”61 The Court’s reasoning for providing an
automobile warrant exception is grounded in the two justifications.
First, the “inherent mobility of automobiles creates circumstances of
such exigency that, as a practical necessity, rigorous enforcement of the
warrant requirement is impossible.”62 Even if the vehicle is not actually
moving at the time of the encounter, “the vehicle is obviously readily mobile
by the turn of an ignition key.”63 In summary, restricting officers from
searching an automobile until a lawful warrant is obtained presents serious
risks; by that time, it is likely that automobile has been removed from the
jurisdiction and the contraband has been destroyed.64
On the other hand, “the Court has also upheld warrantless searches
where no immediate danger was presented that the car would be removed
from the jurisdiction.”65 The second justification provided in Carroll is that
an individual has a “reduced expectation of privacy in an automobile, owing
to its pervasive regulation.”66 But, in Delaware v. Prouse, the Court found
that “[a]n individual operating or traveling in an automobile does not lose all
reasonable expectation of privacy simply because the automobile and its use
are subject to government regulation.”67 Justice White, writing for the
majority, emphasized the practicality of automobile travel:
Automobile travel is a basic, pervasive, and often necessary
mode of transportation to and from one’s home, workplace,
and leisure activities. Many people spend more hours each
60

See generally Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).

61

United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 805, 808 (1982) (“[T]he probable-cause determination
must be based on objective facts that could justify the issuance of a warrant by a magistrate and not merely
on the subjective good faith of the police officers.”); Carroll, 267 U.S. at 149.
62

Opperman, 428 U.S. at 367.

63

California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393 (1985).

64

See id. at 390–91; Carroll, 267 U.S. at 151, 153.

65

Opperman, 428 U.S. at 367.

66

Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996).

67

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662 (1979).
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day traveling in cars than walking on the streets.
Undoubtedly, many find a greater sense of security and
privacy in traveling in an automobile than they do in
exposing themselves by pedestrian or other modes of travel.
Were the individual subject to unfettered governmental
intrusion every time he entered an automobile, the security
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment would be seriously
circumscribed.68
The majority’s opinion in Carroll previews an intuitive understanding
of the future of transportation. Given the importance of automobiles today, it
would be unreasonable for any court to hold that individuals do not have an
expectation of privacy in automobiles. Such a finding would severely
diminish the rights of countless individuals, considering that automobile
travel is no longer optional in most parts of the world. While it is established
that an individual’s privacy interests are diminished in an automobile, this
“interest is nevertheless important and deserving of constitutional
protection.”69
a. The Scope of Searches Under the Automobile Exception
Although the Carroll exception allows lawful warrantless searches of
automobiles, a search of “intolerable intensity and scope” will deem the
search unconstitutional.70 Under United States v. Ross, a warrantless search
under the automobile exception always allows officers to conduct “a ‘probing
search’ of compartments and containers within the automobile so long as the
search is supported by probable cause.”71 Searches can be “as thorough as a
magistrate could authorize in a warrant ‘particularly describing the place to
be searched.’”72 In summary, the scope “is no narrower–and no broader–than
the scope of a search authorized by a warrant supported by probable cause.”73
The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile “is defined by the
object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe
that it may be found.”74 It “is not defined by the nature of the container in
which the contraband is secreted.”75 Therefore, “[i]f probable cause justifies
68

Id. at 662–63.

69

Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 345 (2009).

70

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1968).

71

California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 570 (1991) (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798,
800 (1982)).
72

Ross, 456 U.S. at 800 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend IV).

73

Id. at 823.

74

Id. at 824.

75

Id.
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the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part
of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.”76
i.

California v. Acevedo’s Container Rule

Even after the Ross decision, it was unclear whether an officer had to
establish probable cause in relation to each container searched.77 The
Supreme Court addressed this issue in California v. Acevedo.78 It held that
“police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they
have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained.”79 In
other words, warrantless searches of containers inside of an automobile, are
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if an officer had probable cause to
search the automobile in the first place.80 Nevertheless, this broad rule has
one caveat: for a container to be within the scope of a warrantless automobile
search, the container must be found in the particular part of the automobile
in which the police have probable cause to believe that contraband is
hidden.81 For example, probable cause that a container found in the trunk of
a vehicle contains contraband does not justify a search of the entire vehicle;
it only justifies a search of the container in the trunk.82 The Acevedo Court
acknowledged that “the privacy interests in a car’s trunk or glove
compartment may be no less than those in a movable container.”83 Even with
this geographical limitation, warrantless searches of automobiles have few
restrictions.
2.

Search Incident to Arrest in the Automobile Context

Aside from the automobile exception, a warrantless search of an
automobile may be permissible incident to a lawful arrest. Under the search
incident to arrest rule, when an individual is lawfully arrested, an officer can
conduct a full search of the arrestee’s person.84 In the interest of officer safety
76

Id. at 825.
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See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 574 (1991).
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Id. at 573.
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Id. at 580.
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See id.
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See id. at 592 (White, J., dissenting) (“Because the police can seize the container which is the
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Court today recognizes, they have no authority to do so.”).
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See id.
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Id. at 573 (1991) (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 (1982)).
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Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (finding that under the search incident to arrest
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person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction”).
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and evidence preservation,85 an officer could also search the area within the
arrestee’s immediate control. Also known as the grabbing area, the Court
construed “that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.”86 Depending on the area
where an individual is arrested, the scope of these warrantless searches can
be extended further to include other persons and items.
The scope of the search incident to arrest rule was considered in the
automobile context in Arizona v. Gant.87 The Court overruled the broad
interpretation of the rule in New York v. Belton, which allowed an automatic
search of the passenger compartment pursuant to a lawful arrest of an
occupant.88 Under Gant, a search incident to arrest “permit[s] an officer to
conduct a vehicle search when an arrestee is within reaching distance of the
vehicle or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the
offense of arrest.”89 The majority contends that the rule is grounded in
“concern[s] about giving police officers unbridled discretion to rummage at
will among a person’s private effects.”90 Yet, the searches permissible under
the rule are very extensive. If either of the prongs of the Gant test are met, it
“authorize[s] police officers to search not just the passenger compartment but
every purse, briefcase, or other container within that space.”91 In justification,
the Court claimed that “[t]hese exceptions together ensure that officers may
search a vehicle when genuine safety or evidentiary concerns encountered
during the arrest of a vehicle’s recent occupant justify a search.”92
a.

Passenger’s Privacy Rights: Wyoming v. Houghton’s
Common Enterprise Assumption

Wyoming v. Houghton’s common enterprise assumption is the best
guidance provided by the Court on this passenger privacy question.93 In
Houghton, a police officer pulled over David Young because his car had a
85

See id.
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Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 339 (2009) (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763).
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See generally id. at 332.
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See generally New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
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Gant, 556 U.S. at 346.
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Id. at 345.
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Id.

92

Id. at 347.
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See generally Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999); Daniel J. Hewitt, Don’t Accept
Rides from Strangers: The Supreme Court Hastens the Demise of Passenger Privacy in American
Automobiles, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 875 (2000); see also Think Twice Before Sharing a Ride:
Probable Cause to Arrest All Occupants of Vehicle, 18 NO. 1 CRIM. PRAC. REP. 1 (2004) (discussing the
implications of the common enterprise assumption for passengers in a vehicle containing illegal
contraband).
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faulty break light and he was speeding.94 Young was accompanied by his
girlfriend and Sandra Houghton.95 When he approached, the officer noticed
a needle in Young’s shirt pocket.96 Notwithstanding the fact that Young
admitted to using the needle to take drugs, the officer searched the passenger
compartment for contraband.97 The search uncovered a purse which
Houghton claimed to be hers.98 The officer then proceeded to search
Houghton’s purse, in which he found drug paraphernalia and
methamphetamine.99 Houghton was subsequently arrested and contested the
validity of the search.100 The Supreme Court found the search of Houghton’s
purse was reasonable and introduced the common enterprise assumption.101
Under the common enterprise rule, when an officer is conducting a
lawful search based upon probable cause, a presumption arises that the
occupants in a vehicle are in a common enterprise.102 Based on the
assumption, “it is reasonable for police officers . . . to examine packages and
containers [found inside the vehicle] without a showing of individualized
probable cause for each one.”103 The Court claims that a driver and passenger
will often “have the same interest in concealing the fruits or the evidence of
their wrongdoing.”104
In effect, the common enterprise rule under Houghton is an automatic
presumption. Simply being a passenger in a vehicle which is stopped and
subsequently searched, is sufficient for this assumption to arise. An officer
does not need a “positive reason to believe that the passenger and driver were
engaged in a common enterprise, or positive reason to believe that the driver
had time and occasion to conceal the item in the passenger’s belongings,
surreptitiously or with friendly permission.”105 Instead, an officer can search
a passenger’s belongings even without suspicion. Justice Steven’s dissent
points out that the “assumption of common enterprise between the passenger
and driver of a car [are] based simply on physical proximity.”106
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Id. at 302.

104

Id. at 304–05.

105

Id. at 305.

106

Hewitt, supra note 93 at 897.

2019]

The Constitutional Risks of Ridesharing

565

This doctrine was revisited in Maryland v. Pringle.107 In that case, an
officer stopped and searched an automobile which contained large quantity
of drugs and cash.108 When the three occupants of the vehicle denied
knowledge of the drugs and cash, the officer presumed they were in a
common enterprise and placed all three occupants under arrest.109 On review,
the Court found it was “an entirely reasonable inference from these facts that
any or all three of the occupants had knowledge of, and exercised dominion
and control over, the cocaine.”110 It noted that “[t]he quantity of drugs and
cash in the car indicated the likelihood of drug dealing, an enterprise to which
a dealer would be unlikely to admit an innocent person with the potential to
furnish evidence against him.”111 All in all, the majority’s view is that
“[w]hile the Fourth Amendment does not permit guilt by association, . . . it
does allow police officers to use common sense and infer a common
enterprise among co-passengers of a small automobile where drug dealing is
likely.”112 Allowing officers to use their common sense to analyze the
situation before presuming that the driver and passenger are engaged in a
common enterprise, might indicate that the common enterprise assumption
does not always arise automatically anymore.
II. SOMETHING OLD AND SOMETHING NEW: TRADITIONAL FORHIRE VEHICLES AND MODERN FOR-HIRE VEHICLES
A.

Fourth Amendment Taxonomy of Passenger Rides

Most individuals select their method of transportation without any
thought of the implications it may have on their Fourth Amendment rights.
But the unrecognized reality is that an individual’s Fourth Amendment
protections may be heightened or diminished depending on the type of
vehicle they are in or type of ride in which they are engaging. A consistent
analysis of the existing Fourth Amendment suggests that a passenger’s choice
of transportation will dictate the permissible scope of police intrusion
throughout their ride.
For this Comment, I have categorized passenger rides into three
classifications, which I will refer to as “the taxonomy of passenger rides.”
For purposes of the Fourth Amendment, this categorization is best described
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as a taxonomy because it classifies the types of rides passengers commonly
engage in according to the nature of the ride and the type of vehicle the ride
is completed in. The taxonomy of passenger rides facilitates the analysis and
application of the existing Fourth Amendment doctrine.
The first type of rides are gratuitous or friendly rides in which
individuals choose to ride as passengers in a friend’s or family member’s
vehicle. This type of ride is non-commercial: the passenger does not pay a
fare for the ride because the driver and the passenger have some type of noncommercial relationship.113 The driver uses his personal non-commercial
vehicle114 to transport the passenger.
Next, some passengers opt for paid transportation such as taxicabs,
limousines, and buses. These types of rides, known as traditional for-hire
rides,115 require that the passenger pay a fare for the service. The driver and
passenger have no connection aside from this commercial transportation
transaction.116 Traditional for-hire vehicles are specifically manufactured for
commercial use, and typically include physical partitions dividing the
passenger area from the driver’s area. For example, most taxicabs have a
physical partition which divides the cab into two cabins: the driver’s cabin
and the passenger cabin.
Lastly, passengers can elect to take an Uber or Lyft, a quasi-private
vehicle engaging in ridesharing rides, or modern for-hire rides. The driver
and passenger are matched through a smartphone application.117 Similar to
traditional for-hire rides, the driver and passenger have no connection aside
from the immediate commercial transportation transaction.118 Drivers use
their private vehicles to complete these commercial rides, so unlike
traditional for-hire vehicles, these vehicles do not have a physical partition.
Uber and Lyft drivers use their personal vehicle during “work hours” and are
likely to continue to use the same vehicle after and before subsequent shifts.
A close reading of the Katz 119 test and the Fourth Amendment doctrine
mentioned in Part I of this Comment, indicate that courts must take into
account the difference between these types of rides and analyze how the
113 This relationship requirement can include (but is not limited to): friends, neighbors, family,
and co-conspirators.
114 The vehicle is owned and used by the driver for personal purposes, such as commuting to
everyday activities.
115

I will also use the term “traditional for-hire” as a short reference throughout this Comment.

116

Situations where a commercial driver has a long-standing agreement with a passenger, in which
the driver provides rides regularly for the passenger, are outside of the scope of this paper.
117 How Lyft Works: 6 Things to Know Before Your First Ride, LYFT BLOG (Jun. 9, 2016),
https://blog.lyft.com/posts/how-does-lyft-work.
118 Situations where a modern for-hire driver has a long-standing agreement with a passenger, in
which the driver provides rides regularly for the passenger, are outside of the scope of this paper.
119
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differences affect the passenger’s subjective expectation of privacy and
society’s objective expectation of privacy. The taxonomy of passenger rides
will facilitate the Katz analysis when conducted by future courts.120
1.

For-Hire Vehicles

In order to understand the taxonomy, it is essential to understand the
origin of for-hire rides. A car for-hire is a vehicle used to provide individuals
with transportation services in exchange for monetary compensation.121 In
reality “any motor vehicle, when used for transporting persons or goods for
compensation” is a for-hire vehicle.122 Typically, they are commercial
vehicles such as taxicabs, limousines, and buses.123 Traditional black cars and
app-based car services like Uber and Lyft have also been classified as forhire vehicles.124 Much like Uber and Lyft, a black car service is a company
who subcontracts work to independent drivers that own and operate their own
vehicles.125 In New York, black cars are considered “[a] segment of the forhire vehicle industry [which] primarily serves business clientele with luxury
cars.”126
This Comment divides for-hire vehicles into two classifications:
traditional for-hire vehicles and modern for-hire vehicles. Traditional for-hire
vehicles include forms of commercial transportation that have been already
analyzed by the courts: taxicabs, limousines, buses, and black cars. Modern
for-hire vehicles include the vehicles used in app-based ridesharing services
like Uber and Lyft, which have not yet been analyzed by the courts.
2.

Traditional For-Hire Vehicles: A Passenger’s Reasonable
Expectation of Privacy in a Taxicab

There is vast precedent discussing the reasonable expectation of privacy
of passengers in traditional for-hire vehicles. While the lower courts are split
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on question of passenger privacy, the Katz Court clearly established that an
individual in a taxicab “may rely upon the protection of the Fourth
Amendment.”127 Consistent with the Court’s analysis in Katz, other courts
have found that the fare, the right to control the vehicle’s destination, and the
right to exclude, sufficiently establish a taxicab passenger’s reasonable
expectation of privacy.128
In United States v. Santiago, the District Court for the Southern District
of New York held that passengers in taxicabs have a reasonable expectation
of privacy based on their ability to exclude others from the ride.129 The court
found that a taxicab passenger’s expectation of privacy is objectively
reasonable because the rear area of the taxicab is the area that the passenger
pays to control.130 This finding turned on the distinction that “[t]ypically, a
passenger in an automobile does not have a right to expect privacy as he has
no right to exclude others from the car.”131 In contrast, because a taxicab
passenger determines the destination of the taxicab, the passenger “may
exclude others from the cab, as he has hired the cab for his exclusive use for
the duration of his trip. In effect, the passenger area belongs to the passenger
who pays for it during the course of the trip.”132
In United States v. Bulluck, the District Court for the Southern District
of New York rejected the contention that taxicab passengers have the ability
to exclude others.133 First, it found that a passenger’s ability to object to the
cab driver taking on another fare did not equate to the capacity to exclude all
other individuals from the cab.134 Then, the court maintained that
“[p]assengers have no meaningful privacy in a cab,”135 because the driver “is
inches away at all times and can see and hear everything that is happening in
the rear seat.”136 Most importantly, the court alleged that passengers do not
have sufficient dominion or control of the taxicab because “the cab driver
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See United States v. Santiago, 950 F. Supp. 590, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Chapa v. State, 729
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never surrenders actual control over the cab to a passenger, maintains custody
of the keys to the cab, and controls its locks at all times.”137
Subsequently, United States v. Mota was decided, in which the District
Court recognized that Bulluck incorrectly held that passengers in taxicabs did
not have an expectation of privacy.138 It mentions that occasionally courts
have found that taxicab passengers have an expectation of privacy “by virtue
of their ability to exclude others and determine the course of the taxicab for
the duration of their ride.”139 Impliedly, Bulluck can only stand for the
proposition that the power to object to a driver taking on another fare is not
sufficient to establish a passenger’s control and ability to exclude others for
the duration of the ride.140 In effect, it leaves open the possibility for future
litigants to establish that for-hire passengers have sufficient control under
Katz based on other abilities.141
3.

Modern For-Hire Vehicles: The Advent of Technology
Based Transportation

While Uber and Lyft may be well known in the transportation market,
the nature of the rides provided by these companies are an issue of first
impression to the Fourth Amendment. Although the quasi-private vehicles
used by Uber and Lyft are for-hire vehicles, they are distinguishable from
taxicabs and limousines. Modern for-hire vehicles do not fit in neatly into the
courts’ Fourth Amendment analysis of traditional for-hire vehicles. In order
to make sense of the reasoning behind the taxonomy of passenger rides, it is
important to understand ridesharing and become familiar with the companies
who provide these services.142
Nowadays, ridesharing is most individuals’ preferred method of
transportation. Ridesharing is an arrangement made through a smartphone
application “in which a passenger travels in a private vehicle driven by its
owner for a fee.”143 These services are particularly popular in cities like New
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York and San Francisco where taxicabs are difficult to hail.144 Determination
to make transportation cheaper and easier lead to the creation of an affordable
black car service with a technological twist.145 The evolution was led by two
companies known as Uber and Lyft.146 The first ridesharing application,
created by Uber Technologies Inc., hit the market in June 2010.147
Subsequently, Lyft launched in 2012.148
Although Uber and Lyft are separate companies, essentially, they
provide the same service: commercial transportation in privately owned
vehicles driven by the vehicle’s owner. Gone are the days of hailing rides on
the side of the road. Uber and Lyft users can request a ride remotely in the
tap of a finger.149 To initiate a ride, users log into the respective software
application on their smartphone and request a ride.150 The user has an option
to select a car-pool style ride in which the driver can pick up other customers,
or the user can opt to request a private ride.151 Once the user is paired with an
available driver via the application, the user is given access to the driver’s
profile, which includes a rating based on ratings given by prior riders, “their
name, a headshot, the make and model of their car, a photo of the car, and
their approximate ETA in minutes.”152 Next, the driver will pick up the user
in a privately owned vehicle and will drive the user to the selected
destination.153 To assure that their vehicles are easily recognizable, Uber’s
“driver partners”154 display a reflective “U” sign in the passenger side
windshield during the hours they are actively working for Uber.155 “Lyft

144 Sarah Mitroff, Uber vs Lyft: 9 Things to Consider Before Your First Ride, C|NET (Nov. 2,
2015), https://www.cnet.com/how-to/uber-lyft-ride-share-ride-hailing/.
145 Artyom Dogtiev, Uber Revenue and Usage Statistics 2017, BUSINESSOFAPPS (Jan. 8, 2018),
http://www.businessofapps.com/data/uber-statistics/.
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gives each driver a ‘Carstache’ (a big fuzzy pink mustache) to attach to the
front of his car when using it to give ‘Lyfts.’”156
During the ride, the smartphone application provides the user with a real
time map of the ride.157 The user can change the destination of the ride at any
time through application.158 At the end of the ride, the user is asked to rate
the driver and provide feedback.159 The driver is also asked to rate the user.160
The user’s rating is used to pair the user in future rides.161 The rating feature
is important, for both drivers and passengers, because it gives them the option
of screening out their match. For passengers, a “low rating – perhaps because
you trashed their car . . . [or] were rude . . . –can mean that fewer drivers will
accept your requests for a ride.”162 For modern for-hire drivers, “[u]nlike taxi
drivers, whose driving behavior won’t necessarily affect their ability to
continue to pick up passengers, low ratings on Lyft and Uber can cause
drivers to lose opportunities to get business or even face penalties from the
companies.”163 All in all, modern for-hire vehicles are distinguishable from
traditional for-hire vehicles in many ways, which affect individuals’
expectation of privacy and shapes the “evolution of societal privacy
expectations.”164
III. CONFRONTING AN OLD PROBLEM IN A NEW SETTING:
PREDICTING THE PRIVACY INTERESTS OF PASSENGERS IN
MODERN FOR-HIRE VEHICLES
A.

Revisiting the Fourth Amendment Doctrine

As technology and transportation evolve, the validity of the existing
privacy protections is questioned. A proper analysis of the existing Fourth
Amendment doctrine is conducted “under traditional standards of
reasonableness by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which . . . [the
search] intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to
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which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”165
Interpretation of “[t]he Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of
what was deemed an unreasonable search . . . when it was adopted, and in a
manner which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights
of individual citizens.”166
In anticipation of cases concerning the Fourth Amendment protections
of passengers in modern for-hire vehicles, the Court needs to establish
jurisprudence that adequately delineates the privacy rights in modern for-hire
vehicles. The existing precedent does not adequately “conserve public
interests . . . [or] the interests and rights of individual citizens.”167 Because
the existing Fourth Amendment doctrine is long-established, it is unlikely
that the Court will abandon this precedent. Instead, the existing doctrine
should be used to provide future courts with the tools to address this privacy
question. But it is important for future courts to take into consideration that
modern for-hire vehicles are quasi-private, a hybrid between private and
commercial vehicles. Therefore, while precedent addressing the privacy
rights of traditional for-hire passengers may be informative, it fails to account
for the private aspects of these rides.
B.

Passengers in Modern For-Hire Vehicles Have a Reasonable
Expectation of Privacy Under Katz v. United States

Future courts should consider that modern “advances . . . affect the Katz
test by shaping the evolution of societal privacy expectations.”168 Thus, in
assessing the reasonableness of the common enterprise assumption and the
search incident to arrest rule, courts should begin by examining the effects of
the geographic composition of the interior of modern for-hire vehicles and
the amount of control passengers have over the vehicle. A consistent reading
of the Fourth Amendment precedent suggests that future courts will find that
both prongs of the Katz test are met when framed by those considerations.169
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The Geographical Composition of the Interior Cabin of
Modern For-Hire Vehicles Supports Passengers’ Subjective
Expectation of Privacy

The existing Fourth Amendment precedent limits the scope of a
passenger’s expectation of privacy to the passenger compartment of the
vehicle.170 The notion is that the “the passenger area belongs to the passenger
who pays for it during the course of the trip.”171 In traditional for-hire vehicles
this makes sense because taxicabs, buses, and limousines usually have a
partition which physically divides the vehicle into two cabins: the driver’s
cabin and the passenger’s cabin. The partition serves two important
functions. First, it prevents the passenger from reaching into the front cabin
and adjusting the air conditioning and radio. Most importantly, it alerts
passengers that their area of control is the passenger compartment.
In a modern for-hire vehicle, it is unclear what geographical area would
be considered the passenger compartment. Drivers use their own personal,
privately owned non-commercial vehicles. Unlike commercial vehicles,172
private vehicles typically do not have physical partitions that divide the
passenger compartment from the driver’s compartment. These vehicles
usually have an open format, without physical barriers to restrict the areas a
passenger can access. This makes it even harder for a modern for-hire
passenger to subjectively delineate the geographical areas which he has
control over.
To further muddy the waters, Uber and Lyft do not restrict the areas in
which passengers can sit. Instead, they invite passengers to sit both in the
front and in the back of the vehicle.173 Although some taxicab drivers may
allow passengers to sit in the front seat, taxicab passengers rarely sit in the
front because the partitions suggest that the front seat is off limits. Not only
are the physical restrictions lacking in modern for-hire vehicles, but Uber’s
and Lyft’s conduct promotes the line blurring. It cannot be reasonably
predicted where a modern for-hire passenger will sit.
Based on the geographical composition of modern for-hire vehicles, it
is reasonable for a passenger to believe that he has an expectation of privacy
in the interior of the vehicle. A passenger has unrestricted ability to reach
170 See generally Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 332 (2009); United States v. Santiago, 950 F.
Supp. 590, 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
171
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forward from the back seat to adjust the air conditioning or the radio. The
passenger can also reach forward and place his belongings in the front
passenger seat while still occupying the back seat. Passengers can even
choose whether they want to sit in the front or back seat. In sum, the open
format of modern for-hire vehicles allows passengers to exert physical
control over the entire interior of the vehicle, not only the area where the
passenger is seated.
2.

Passengers Have Lawful Control over Modern For-Hire
Vehicles by Virtue of Their Right to Exclude

The objective prong of the Katz test requires that an individual’s
subjective expectation of privacy is “one that society is prepared to recognize
as ‘reasonable.’”174 The Fourth Amendment doctrine suggests that a
passenger who can establish that he has sufficient control over the vehicle
and a right to exclude others for the duration of the ride, meets this prong of
the test. All the more reason, modern for-hire passengers’ subjective
expectation of privacy is likely to satisfy the objective prong of the Katz
test.175
To begin, the Bulluck court incorrectly alleges that passengers do not
have sufficient control over for-hire vehicles because the driver never
surrenders actual control over the vehicle “to a passenger, [because the
driver] maintains custody of the keys . . . , and controls its locks at all
times.”176 This assertion is explicitly incorrect because the Katz test does not
require that a passenger have actual control of the vehicle. The Court has held
that an individual who has lawful control of property “will in all likelihood
have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of [his] right to exclude.”177
While it is unclear what future courts will find to be sufficient to satisfy this
requirement, in Santiago the court held that a passenger’s ability to determine
the destination of a taxicab and ability to exclude others was sufficient to
establish lawful control.178 Other courts have noted that controlling access to
the vehicle and deciding who is invited to share the space is sufficient.179A
consistent reading of this precedent suggests that the nature of modern for-
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hire rides and the mobile application provides passengers lawful control over
the vehicle and the ability to exclude others from the ride.
Next, the ratings system in the mobile application allows passengers to
exclude others. Drivers’ ratings can be used as a screening feature by
passengers to decide who they want to share space with. Passengers can
decide to only ride with drivers who have a high rating. The application even
allows passengers to cancel a ride based on a driver’s poor rating. Impliedly,
this screening feature gives passengers control over who they will be sharing
a vehicle with.
Further, a modern for-hire passenger controls access to the vehicle.180
When requesting a ride, the mobile application prompts modern-for hire
passengers with the option to request a private ride or a carpool-style ride.181
Unlike taxicabs, this feature vests modern for-hire passengers with the power
to exclude others from the ride at the very outset of the engagement. The
driver cannot force a passenger to grant access to others for the duration of
the ride. The car-pool option, available on both Uber and Lyft, is the only
way a driver can pick up other customers while engaging on a ride.182 The
passenger is the only person who can make the decision to allow or to exclude
others. By accepting a non-carpool ride, modern for-hire drivers are expressly
acknowledging the passenger’s power to exclude. This feature alone should
establish that modern for-hire passengers have a reasonable expectation of
privacy.
Lastly, modern for-hire passengers’ ability to determine the destination
of the vehicle is sufficient to establish lawful control. Like the taxicab
passengers in Santiago, modern for-hire passengers decide where the vehicle
will be going and if there will be any stops along the way, and have the ability
to direct the driver to take a preferred route.183 The mobile application allows
passengers to change the vehicle’s destination in real time, without approval
of the driver. Most ridesharing companies force the driver to comply with the
passenger’s suggested route even if it is longer or more troublesome. Even if
the driver can refuse the change, the passenger’s ability to change the
destination and route of the vehicle at any time establishes that modern forhire passengers are clearly in control of the vehicle for the duration of the
ride.
In sum, a modern for-hire passenger’s expectation of privacy is
manifested by screening drivers, selecting a private ride, entering the vehicle,
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closing the door, and controlling the destination of the vehicle.184 From a
Fourth Amendment perspective these features are important because privacy
depends on an individual’s ability to control access to the vehicle and to
decide who is invited to share the space.185 Accordingly, modern for-hire
passengers’ expectation of privacy is “one that society is prepared to
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”186
C.

The Common Enterprise Rule is Outdated

Considering that future courts are likely to hold that passengers in
modern for-hire vehicles have a reasonable expectation of privacy, the
validity of the common enterprise assumption is at risk. A close reading of
the common enterprise jurisprudence shows that the Court’s understanding
of transportation and passengers is outdated. It is important to remember that
if evidence of wrongdoing is uncovered, regardless of whether any of the
occupants in the vehicle take ownership, the common enterprise assumption
will operate to automatically supply probable cause to search all of the
occupants and the vehicle.187 The common enterprise rule incorrectly
assumes that a driver and passenger always share a common interest “in
concealing the fruits or the evidence of their wrongdoing.”188 Logically, a
common interest in harboring evidence is only plausible if the occupants have
an ongoing relationship. Surely, a stranger will have no knowledge of any
evidence of wrongdoing that could be found in the vehicle.
Keeping in mind that the Houghton majority denies that the assumption
is based on “mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal
activity,”189 the only reasonable explanation for this rule is that Court
assumed that people only ride in cars with friends, neighbors, family, coconspirators, or the like. Impliedly, the belief is that individuals do not
typically ride in vehicles with strangers. And so, the Houghton decision failed
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to account for modern transportation, a time when passengers and drivers
have no relationship prior to engaging in the ride.190
1.

The Nature of Modern For-Hire Rides Negates the Validity
of the Common Enterprise Assumption

To the extent that it might have been reasonable for the Court to assume
a common interest between a driver and passengers, the advent of modern
for-hire vehicles raises serious doubt to the plausibility of that inference.
After the creation of Uber and Lyft, it is much more likely for persons to ride
in vehicles with total strangers. The inference that a driver and passenger
would have an interest in concealing evidence of wrongdoing is only
plausible in non-commercial rides in private vehicles because these drivers
and passengers commonly have an ongoing relationship. In contrast, the
commercial nature of modern for-hire rides and the fleeting status of these
passengers render the common enterprise presumption unreasonable in a
modern for-hire vehicle.
The commercial nature of modern for-hire rides expressly negates the
possibility of a common enterprise: modern for-hire passengers and drivers
have no connection aside from the immediate ride they are engaging in.191
Uber and Lyft rides are commercial transportation transactions. The driver
and passenger are matched through a ridesharing app.192 Modern for-hire
drivers meet their passengers immediately before they enter the vehicle or
once they are inside the vehicle. After the completion of a ride, the driver is
likely to never see the passenger again. Although the application allows for
drivers and passengers to screen each other before accepting a ride, this
feature only provides their name and rating.193 While a driver may choose to
accept a ride based a passenger’s five-star rating, it does not logically suggest
that the driver will have a common interest in concealing the fruits of the
passenger’s criminal activity. In the event that a lawful search of the vehicle
uncovers contraband, it is unreasonable to assume that the driver would have
any interest in protecting, harboring, or hiding any incriminating evidence for
the passenger (and vice versa).
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The Introduction of a Fact Driven Analysis for the Common
Enterprise Assumption

The common enterprise rule subjects individuals in modern for-hire
vehicles to highly intrusive searches simply for being in close proximity to
other law-breaking individuals. Because officers need more than just “mere
propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity . . . [to]
give rise to probable cause to search that person,”194 the common enterprise
assumption is unreasonable in modern for-hire vehicles. Thus, a future court
will need to alter the applicability of the common enterprise rule in a way that
adequately balances the passengers’ privacy interests and the government’s
interests.
A modern interpretation of the common enterprise assumption is best
embodied by converting this rule into a standard. Houghton’s common
enterprise rule is an automatic presumption that arises without any
consideration of the facts.195 On the other hand, the analysis in Pringle makes
clear that in reviewing the validity of the common enterprise assumption,
courts should consider the facts and circumstances of each case.196 The
Pringle decision suggests that officers should be required to use their
common sense and every day experience to properly infer a common
enterprise.197 In essence, the Court opened the door to the possibility of
applying the common enterprise assumption as a standard, instead of a rule.
Even the lower courts have typically required officers to establish “something
extra” in order to act on the inference of common enterprise. 198 For example,
courts have required “that the passenger in question had been a co-traveler
for a longer time, had fled from the police, or in response to police
questioning had been untruthful, evasive or very nervous.”199
In light of the intrusiveness of warrantless searches, the common
enterprise rule should be applied as a standard, instead of a rule, which
requires that officers consider the facts and circumstances of each case before
presuming that occupants in a vehicle are engaged in a common enterprise.
Using common sense and every day experience, officers should be required
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to ask the driver and passenger questions to ascertain the relationship
between the passenger and driver, the nature of the ride, and the status of the
passenger. This will indicate whether the ride is commercial (traditional forhire ride), private (friendly ride), or quasi-private (modern for-hire ride). The
classification of the ride will equip the officer to correctly decide whether a
common enterprise actually exists. Generally, the common enterprise
assumption is more likely to be reasonable in non-commercial rides—private
vehicles in which the driver and passengers are friends, family, or the like.
The assumption is least reasonable in modern for-hire vehicles. In the event
that the facts and circumstances of the encounter provide an officer with a
reasonable basis to believe there is a common enterprise, the officer can
conduct a warrantless search of the passenger. Absent a positive reason to
believe that a common enterprise exists, a warrantless search of the passenger
is unreasonable and prohibited.
a.

The Appearance of a Modern For-Hire Vehicle
Suggests to a Reasonable Officer that a Common
Enterprise Does Not Exist

Under the standard approach proposed in the previous section, the
appearance of modern for-hire vehicles should suggest to officers the absence
of a common enterprise. While modern for-hire vehicles are privately owned
vehicles, a reasonable officer using common sense and every day experience
can easily determine that the occupants of a modern for-hire vehicle are not
in common enterprise. From the outside looking in, modern for-hire vehicles
look like normal vehicles. But if an officer takes a closer look, the common
enterprise assumption is likely to be dispelled. First, Uber and Lyft drivers
are required to have a trade dress sticker denoting the company’s logo in their
windshield.200 The logo displayed in the windshield should be sufficient to
prompt a reasonable officer to inquire further about the nature of the ride. An
officer upon seeing a vehicle with an Uber or Lyft sign in the windshield,
with a phone mount holding a smartphone providing GPS services and a
passenger, should reasonably infer that the driver-passenger relationship is
one of commercial transportation. If the officer is unsure, he should be
required to ask if the driver is conducting ridesharing services. As evidenced
by the facts and circumstances of modern for-hire rides, the common
enterprise assumption is least reasonable in modern for-hire vehicles.
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The Search Incident to Arrest Doctrine Permits Unreasonably
Intrusive Searches of Modern For-Hire Passengers

As if the common enterprise assumption was not daunting enough,
passengers in modern for-hire vehicles will be exposed to highly intrusive
searches under the search incident to arrest rule. In justification, the Court
contends that applicability of the first prong of the Gant test is rare because
“articles inside the passenger compartment are rarely ‘within the area into
which an arrestee might reach.’”201 But in many events, “the offense of arrest
will supply a basis for searching the passenger compartment of an arrestee’s
vehicle and any containers therein.”202 In a situation where the driver is
arrested for an offense that leads police to reasonably believe that evidence
of that offense could be found in the vehicle, officers can conduct a full search
of the passengers and their belongings.203 In effect, the particularized
suspicion as to the driver is automatically transferred on to the passengers.
While this search is restricted to uncovering evidence of the crime of arrest,
if other illegal evidence is found in a police officer’s search, then that other
evidence may be seized. Obviously, this raises serious privacy concerns in
modern for-hire vehicles because passengers will be subject to extremely
intrusive searches based on the conduct of a stranger.
As the rule stands now, passengers are subject to searches they did
nothing to provoke. Simply by being in an arrestee’s vehicle at the time of
arrest, it is assumed that the passenger knows the driver’s history, their habits,
and whether the driver is law abiding or not. This assumption is only
reasonable when the passenger has actual familiarity with the driver. By
choosing to ride in a car with friends and neighbors, passengers may take
certain risks based on the logical assumptions that can be made. Friends are
more likely to know enough about the driver, their habits, and their
background to knowledgeably assess the risks they are subjecting themselves
to by riding in their vehicle.
When a passenger has familiarity with the driver, a warrantless search
under the rule is reasonable because the passenger’s self-diminished privacy
interests are outweighed by the government’s interest in police safety and
preserving evidence. For example, consider a situation in which a passenger
is driven by a friend who is known to smoke marijuana while driving in a
state where marijuana is illegal. Even if neither marijuana nor drug
paraphernalia are visible during the time the friend was in the car, the
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passenger has sufficient knowledge about the driver and the car to know that
it is likely that there will be marijuana in the car. Therefore, by getting into
the car despite the passenger’s familiarity with the driver, the passenger
knowingly subjects himself to police intrusion. By getting into a car with a
friend, neighbor, or family member, these passengers have enough
knowledge about the driver and the car to assess the risks they take by
entering into the driver’s vehicle.
On the other hand, a search of a passenger in a modern for-hire vehicle,
incident to arrest of the driver, is highly intrusive and unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. The assumptions that underlie the search incident to
arrest rule do not exist in modern for-hire vehicles. Modern for-hire
passengers do not have enough familiarity with their driver or the vehicle to
make a reasonable risk assessment. While the passenger may know basic
facts about the driver (such as the driver’s name, rating, and the make of the
vehicle), this information is not enough for the passenger to assess the type
of risks he is subjecting himself to by riding in the vehicle. This information
does not caution the passenger about the driver’s habits or what police
intrusion might lie ahead. In application, the passenger’s person and personal
belongings may be subject to a search because the police’s suspicion is
localized to a driver he met 30 seconds ago, despite the fact that the passenger
had no idea or information to cause him to believe the driver would be
engaged in any kind of wrongdoing that would lead to a stop. Given the
nature of these rides, a search of a modern for-hire passenger under the search
incident to arrest exception allows officers to intrude the passenger’s privacy
for being at the wrong place at the wrong time.
As a result, absent a familiarity between the driver and passenger, such
an extensive search of a passenger based on the driver’s arrest incorrectly
“undervalues the privacy interests at stake.”204 The justification for extensive
searches of passengers under the exception is to uncover evidence regarding
the offense committed by the driver, but evidence of the driver’s offense will
not be found on the passenger’s person or belongings. The justifications of
the rule are not served by searching modern for-hire passengers. The driver
and passenger are strangers: considering the nature of these rides, there is no
reasonable basis for believing that evidence of the driver’s offense will be
uncovered by searching the passenger. Instead, this extensive search of
passengers will only uncover evidence unrelated to the offense of arrest,
which will serve to make the rule a pretext for searching passengers in the
absence of probable cause. This rule is only reasonable if the passenger
knows enough about the driver and the car to assess the risk the passenger is
taking by entering into a vehicle which may be subject to police intrusion.

204

Id. at 344–45.

582

FIU Law Review

[Vol. 13:551

Allowing the scope of a search incident to arrest to include searches of
passengers is unreasonable in modern for-hire vehicles. Modern for-hire
passengers do not have sufficient knowledge about the driver or the vehicle
to justify the intrusive search permissible under the search incident to arrest
rule.
IV. RESOLUTION
Future courts are likely to find that passengers in modern for-hire
vehicles have a legitimate expectation of privacy “by virtue of . . . [their] right
to exclude.”205 Yet, the protections of the current Fourth Amendment doctrine
are unreasonable. First, the common enterprise assumption is unreasonable
in modern for-hire vehicles because of the commercial nature of the driverpassenger relationship. Additionally, the scope of searches incident to arrest
are unreasonably broad, because the rule allows modern for-hire passengers
to be searched despite their lack of familiarity with the driver and the vehicle.
Although these are two separate doctrines, they are both based on the archaic
assumption that drivers and passengers typically ride with friends, family, or
co-conspirators. Considering that the essence of modern transportation is that
individuals ride in vehicles with strangers, the Court’s archaic assumptions
are expressly unreasonable. In application, the current doctrine only serves
to diminish a passenger’s privacy rights based simply on physical proximity
to someone “independently suspected of criminal activity.”206
While it may have been optional to use an automobile at one point, today
most individuals need to use automobiles. It is tremendously unreasonable
for an individual to be stripped of his Fourth Amendment protections for
engaging in necessary means of travel. A balancing of interests under
traditional standards of reasonableness suggests that the privacy interests of
passengers in modern for-hire vehicles outweigh the need to promote
legitimate government interests. It is evident that change is needed, but
because the existing Fourth Amendment doctrine is long-established, it is
unlikely that the Court will abandon this precedent. Thus, it should be
updated to accommodate the new realities of modern transportation.
Because modern for-hire vehicles are a hybrid between commercial and
private vehicles, it is important for future courts to understand that their
differences should shape the Fourth Amendment analysis. Using a set of
cogent factors, future courts should consider the impact of modern
transportation on passenger’s privacy interests. These factors include: the
geographical composition of the vehicle, the nature of the ride, an
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individual’s subjective belief of control over a vehicle, and an individual’s
actual ability to control the vehicle.
Next, because the Court has held that “mere propinquity to others”207 is
not enough to establish probable cause, the common enterprise rule and the
search incident to arrest rule should be applied as constitutional standards.
Application of the common enterprise assumption as a standard would
require officers to consider the facts and circumstances of each case before
presuming that occupants in a vehicle are engaged in a common enterprise.
Using common sense and every day experience, officers should be required
to ask the driver and passenger questions to ascertain the relationship
between the passenger and driver, the nature of the ride, and the status of the
passenger. In the event that the facts and circumstances of the encounter
provide an officer with a reasonable basis to believe that there is a common
enterprise, the assumption is proper, and a warrantless search of the
passenger is permissible. Otherwise, absent a positive reason to believe a
common enterprise exists, a warrantless search of a passenger in a modern
for-hire vehicle is unreasonable.
Furthermore, the application of the search incident to arrest doctrine as
a standard would require officers to consider the totality of the circumstances.
In the event that the driver of a modern for-hire vehicle is arrested, and the
offense of arrest provides the officer a reason to believe that evidence of the
offense could be found in the vehicle, the officer can only search the
passenger if the facts and circumstances of the encounter reasonably suggest
that the passenger has sufficient familiarity with the driver. Officers would
be required to ask the driver and passenger questions to ascertain the
relationship between the passenger and driver, the nature of the ride, and the
status of the passenger. Under the search incident to arrest standard, a
warrantless search of the passenger is only permissible if the totality of the
circumstances reasonably suggests that the passenger knew the driver, or that
the passenger had reason to know that there was contraband in the vehicle. If
a passenger does not have sufficient familiarity with the driver and the
vehicle, a warrantless search of the passenger would be unreasonable.
Accordingly, converting the common enterprise assumption and the
search incident to arrest rule into a standard adequately balances the
passengers’ privacy interests with the government’s interests. A standard
driven approach will honor the existing Fourth Amendment precedent but
will also give weight to the distinguishing aspects of modern for-hire
vehicles. This approach will assist future courts in understanding how
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modern advances affect the Katz test and shape “the evolution of societal
privacy expectations.”208

208 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (referencing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 347 (1967)).

